The German Retreat from Stalingrad

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Even as the operation to eliminate von Paulus’ foothold in Stalingrad proceeded, Stavka planned operations to destroy German forces in the Caucasus. This plan included cutting through left flank of Army Group A, commanded by General Kleist, at Elista. A second operation would attack north toward Aravir from the Terek River through the Caucasus passes. A third attack envisioned movements by Vatutin’s and Yeremenko’s forces down the Don River to Rostov. Stavka’s goal was to clear the Caucasus for good.

General Kleist’s analysis of his situation found the Soviet forces 65 kilometers from Rostov while his own units were nearly 630 kilometers from Rostov. Initially, Hitler prohibited a retreat only to authorize a tactical retreat the next day stipulating that Kleist bring all his equipment and supplies with him. General Kleist possessed 18 divisions, including 11 Panzer divisions, one Panzer Grenadier Division and seven infantry divisions. They covered a 160-kilometer front between Zmyev and Slavyansk.

Stavka’s plan ordered Voronezh Front, commanded by General F.I. Golikov, with four infantry armies, a tank army, and an air army, to capture the Liski-Kantemirovka railway. They ordered Southwest Front, commanded by General N.F. Vatutin., with three infantry armies, an air army, and a Front Mobile Group, to establish itself at Starobelsk and attack toward the Black Sea coast at Mariupol. These two fronts possessed 54 divisions and ten tank corps. Both fronts had fought through the entire Stalingrad campaign and bordered on exhaustion. Additionally, the goals of these fronts required advancing on diverging axes with no troops to fill the gap.

To the north, Army Group B fielded 19 divisions. Army Group Don possessed 18 divisions. Field Marshal von Manstein now commanded these forces. Von Manstein demanded permission to withdraw from Rostov to the Mius River line. He received a summons from Hitler to discuss this demand on 6 February, 1943. He went to meet Hitler with some trepidation, but, to von Manstein’s surprise, Hitler authorized a tactical withdrawal and advised von Manstein he would transfer divisions from France to the Ukraine.

As it happened, the Soviets took Voronezh on 26 January, and Kursk on 8 February, 1943.

In the Caucasus the race for Rostov proceeded. The Soviets outran their supply facilities and administrative skills. They possessed less than half the transport needed to bring up food, fuel, and ammunition to cut off the German forces at Rostov. When they took Rostov on 14 February, Kleist and his Army group A had already passed through. Kleist was promoted to field marshal as a result.

On 16 February the Soviets took Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad. In Kharkov the Soviets found the city population of 900,000 had been reduced to 300,000 inhabitants. The Germans had deported 12,000 to German labor camps and 70,000 to 80,000 had died of hunger and cold. Thirty thousand, including sixteen thousand Jews, had been slaughtered.

Soviet forces captured Pavlograd, 32 kilometers from the Dnieper River on 17 February. Kuznetson’s tanks arrived in the vicinity of von Manstein’s headquarters at Zaporozhye.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Soviet Setback after Stalingrad”, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Stalingrad Falls

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On 10 January 1943, at 0805 the Soviet bombardment of Stalingrad began. Along with thousands of guns and mortars, the 16th Air Army joined in supporting the Don Front offensive.

At 0900 the 21st and 24th Armies struck from southeast of Vertyachi eastward toward the Red October factory. Another attack by the 57th and 64th Armies advanced from south of Tysbenko toward Basargino Station, while a third force formed by the 62nd and the 66th Armies attacked towards Gorodisheche.

By the evening of 13 January the 65th and 21st Armies reached the west bank of the Rossochka River. Pitomnik airfield fell to the Soviets on 14 January.

In seven days the Germans lost 780 square kilometers of the 1430 square kilometers they had occupied.

Don Front entered Stalingrad on 17 January.

The final phase of ‘Operation Ring’ consisted of a general assault against the entire front of the German Stalingrad forces. The 21st Army took Gumrak airfield on 21 January and entered the Red October workers’ settlement. The right flank of 65th Army threatened Alexandrovka and the northern edge of the Red October factory.

On 22 January the German VI Army retreated into the city itself. The 21st, 57th, and 64th Soviet Armies utilized 4,100 guns and mortars to advance ten to fifteen kilometers from 22 January to 25 January.

Hitler discussed using a battalion of Panther tanks to take supplies to the surrounded VI Army. Major von Zitzewitz advised Hitler that, if a Panzer Army couldn’t get through the Soviet cordon, a battalion certainly couldn’t. He recommended the VI Army surrender. Hitler’s response was that surrender was out of the question. The surrounded army must resist to the end.

In sixteen days the VI Army lost 94 square kilometers of territory and 100,000 men killed, wounded, or captured.

At last Soviet tanks entered the ruined factories on the north side of Stalingrad. The 21st Army advanced to the Volga River, joining the 62nd Army, thus cutting the German forces in two. The southern sector held the city’s center. The northern sector included the Tractor Factory and the Barricades.

On 27 January the Soviets began destroying the remnants of VI Army. The 21st, 57th, and 64th Armies were tasked with destroying the southern group. General Shumilov’s 64th Army crossed the Tsaritsa River and entered the city’s center.

On 30 January Hitler promoted General von Paulus to field marshal. No field marshal had ever surrendered. On the night of 30/31 January the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade besieged the Central Department Store and captured Lieutenant General Schmitt and Field Marshal von Paulus. The southern group laid down its arms. Hitler wondered why von Paulus had not killed himself.

In the north General Schreck refused to surrender. A barrage of gunfire descended on the northern sector and they surrendered on 2 February.

To the north, on 13 January, General Golikov, commanding Voronezh Front, hammered the II Hungarian and VIII Italian Armies taking 80,000 prisoners and advancing 145 kilometers toward Kharkov. Already STAVKA formed plans for a strategic offensive using the Voronezh, South-West, South, and North Caucasus Fronts. South Front would strike toward Rostov.

Sources: The Soviet Air Force in World War II, translated by Leland Fetzer, Edited by Ray Wagner, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“Soviet Setback after Stalingrad,” Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

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Reducing the Stalingrad Pocket

The Soviet Air Force remained busy during December 1942 supporting 3rd Guards Army and 5th Tank Army’s attacks against German concentrations near Kotelnikovo. 2nd and 17th Air Armies provided 455 aircraft opposing the Luftwaffe’s 450. When 3rd Composite Air Corps joined the 17th Air Army the balance of power shifted to the Soviet side.

Deteriorating weather interrupted air support for the engaged forces until 15 December when the weather again improved. The Soviet Southwest Front went on the offensive on 16 December with the Air Force attacking German defensive lines and troop concentrations at Toerdockhlevovka, Radchenskoye, Boguchev, and airfields at Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk.

On 18 December the 16th Air Army struck enemy forces near Karpovka with 100 aircraft. This attack allowed Soviet forces to break through the German defense lines. By the end of 21 December Soviet air action closed all escape routes for the Italian 8th Army.

The 24th Tank Corps commanded by Major General V.M. Badanov, took the airfields and rail line at Tatsinskaya destroying 350 German aircraft, five equipment dumps, and seven warehouses.

By this time the 2nd Guards Army, reinforced by 6th and 7th Tank Corps, had a two to one superiority in men and tanks, and a 1.6 to 1 superiority in artillery. The Germans still had air superiority 1.7 to 1.

The Soviet 2nd Guards Army forced the German withdrawal from the Aksay River. On 25 December General Rotmistrov’s 7th Tank Corps crossed the river seizing Generalovsky.

On Christmas Day General von Paulus authorized the slaughter of 400 horses for food.

By 28 December the Soviets cut off all escape routes going west and southwest from Kotelnikovo. They also captured another airfield where they acquired fifteen aircraft, 800 cans of petrol, and large numbers of heavy bombs. The next day they captured Kotelnikovo itself.

General S. I. Bogdonov’s forces moved toward Rotmistrov’s corps forcing a general German withdrawal to Rostov.

General Malinovsky took Tormosin on 31 December capturing German supplies for Army Group Don.

As the German relief force fell back the distance between them and the surrounded Stalingrad forces increased to 200 to 250 kilometers. Seven Soviet armies now surrounded the Stalingrad pocket. Within the pocket ammunition, fuel, and food was running out. Eighty thousand German soldiers were lost to sickness and wounds leaving 250,000 remaining. Soviet aircraft shot down any remaining supply transports.

On 1 January, 1943, Adolf Hitler promised von Paulus that everything was being done to get them out. Meanwhile, Von Paulus set up a dense defense network.

The Soviet Don Front received reinforcements. The Stalingrad Front, operating on the inner front included the 57th, 62nd, and 64th Armies. The plan for liquidating the Stalingrad pocket, Operation ‘Ring’, was authorized on 4 January.

65th Army had a superiority over the surrounded German forces in the Stalingrad pocket of three to two in guns and mortars, and three to one in aircraft. The Germans superiority in men and tanks was six to five.

On 8 January the Soviets issued an ultimatum giving the Germans until 1000 hours 9 January to surrender. This ultimatum was rejected.

Leaflets rained down on Stalingrad on 9 January offering troops safety if they surrendered. Resisters would be wiped out. Von Paulus forbade any discussion of surrender.

On 10 January, at 0805 hours, artillery and air bombardment began.

Sources: The Soviet Air Force in World War II, translated by Leland Fetzer, Edited by Ray Wagner, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

‘Operation Winter Storm’

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‘Operation Winter Storm’ kicked off on 12 December, 1942. When the spearhead got close enough to the VI Army, holding Stalingrad, a code word, ‘Thunderclap,’ authorized von Paulus to attempt a breakout from the pocket.

At 0515 General Hoth launched VI Panzer Division’s attack at Kotelnikovo. The first two days they advanced 19 kilometers per day against light opposition reaching the Aksay River escorting 800 trucks loaded with supplies for von Paulus’ troops.

The XXIII Panzer Division attacked the Soviet 302 Rifle Division on 13 December at Biriukov Railway Station. The 13th Mechanized Corps, supported by 30 Il-2 Stumoviks of the Eighth Air Army, blunted the attack preventing the outflanking of the Soviet 126th Rifle Division.

The VI Panzer Division secured a bridgehead over the Aksay River at Zalivskoye. XXIII Panzer Division secured a second bridgehead at Kruglyakovo.

Further south a three day battle began on 14 December with a Soviet attack out of the Kalmyk Steppe.

The Soviet 4 Mechanized Corps pushed the Germans out of Verkhne-Kumsky farmstead on 15 December and back to the Aksay River. By 17 December the 2nd Guards Army concentrated north of the Myshkova defense line between Nizhne Kumsky and Kapinsky by 18 December.

On 17 December the German’s renewed their attack at Verkhne-Kumsky. Tanks, motorized infantry and air support pushed from the Aksay River toward the Myskoya River attacking the 87th Rifle Division, the 4th Cavalry Division, and the 4th Mechanized Corp.

XVII Panzer Division forced the lower Aksay River at Generalovsky on 18 December and, on 19 December pushed 3rd Guards Division out of the collective farm at Verkhne-Kunsky joining VI Panzer Division.

Here the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps held the German attack. The 4th Mechanized Corps was awarded guards status, becoming the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps for this action.

On 16 December the Voronezh Front launched their offensive against the VIII Italian Army, Operational Group Hollidt, and III Rumanian Army. During the three day battle the Soviets advanced south and southeast, the 17th Tank Corps taking Kantemirovka on 19 December.

The 2nd Guards Army arrived from Stalingrad to take up a position on the defensive line along the Myshkova’s north bank.

VI Panzer division reached a point 24 kilometers short of the Myshkovo River when it engaged 300 Soviet tanks at 400 meters range and destroyed 34 T-34 tanks. It reached the Myskovo River on 19 December.

General Hoth had reached a point only 35 to 40 kilometers from the German troops in Stalingrad. The Aksay River was 23 meters wide at that point. Field Marshal von Manstein felt this was the time for von Paulus to make his breakout. Radio communications between the two Field Marshals was blocked by the Russians, so von Manstein sent his intelligence chief, Major Eismann into Stalingrad by Fiesler Storch.

Major Eismann met von Paulus chief of staff, General Schmidt on 19 December. General Schmidt advised Major Eismann that von Paulus required the ‘Thunderclap’ order authorizing the VI Army to breakout to be issued by Hitler. General Schmitt assured Eismann that VI Army could hold Stalingrad until Easter.

On 23 December von Manstein authorized General Hoth to withdraw from the Myshkova River line.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Von Paulus 6th Army Surrounded

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The Soviet plan envisioned the encirclement of the German 6th Army with two mighty arms, cutting them off from the remainder of Army Group South. The Soviet 5th Tank Army, the 21st Army of the Southwest Front under Vatutin, and the 6th Army of the Don Front under Rokossovsky would drive down from the north and swing to the east, while the 64th Army, the 57th Army, and the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front under Yeremenko would launch west and then north to join up near Kalach. The 66th Army and the 62nd Army would continue to hold the city of Stalingrad itself.

The northern wing attacked on 19 November, 1942. The morning mist prevented air support and slowed the advance in the initial stages. The 5th Tank Army and the 21st Army broke through the German defenses northwest of Stalingrad. The 4th Tank Corps of the 21st Army advanced thirty to thirty-four kilometers to capture Mandino.

The southern wing jumped off on 20 November. The 57th Army attacked between Lake Sarpa and Lake Tsatsa. The 51st Army drove between Lake Tsatsa and Lake Barmantsak heading for Sovetsky to the northwest. By that afternoon the 13th Mechanized and the 4th Cavalry Corps were introduced into the gaps.

That same day, on the German side, Field Marshall von Manstein was placed in charge of rebuilding a defensive line. Army Group Don set up a new line along the Chir River between Army Groups A and B. This included Operational Group Hollidt, III Rumanian Army, IV Panzer Army, and IV Rumanian Army. Divisions were brought in from the Caucasus, Voronezh, Orel, France, Germany and Poland.

By 1600 hours, 23 November, the two arms of the Soviet attack joined hands at the Sovetsky Farmstead near Kalach surrounding 22 German divisions, defeating III and IV Rumanian Armies and forming a wall of encirclement. The outside wall measured 452 kilometers, though only 258 kilometers were occupied by troops along the most important axes. The inner and outer wall were separated by 14 to 19 kilometers.

The German defensive gap measured 290 kilometers wide between Bokovskaya and Lake Sarpa. German forces in the Don River bend were isolated.

Von Paulus reported he wished to fall back to the Chir River and set up a hedgehog perimeter. He requested freedom of action with a view to forcing a breakout. Hitler refused to authorize a breakout, ordering von Paulus to fall back to Gumrak airfield. He issued a fuhrerbefehl  to hold out at all costs. He promised von Paulus the 6th Army would be supplied by air. Von Paulus advised Hitler he would need 500 tons of supplies per day. If those were provided he thought he could breakout by Easter.

Again Hitler prohibited a breakout.

Hitler did not confer with the Luftwaffe about supplying 6th Army until the next day. General von Richthofen advised Goering that the Luftwaffe could not support 250,000 men by air. The best he could do was 130 tons the first two days. After that he could only supply 84.4 tons per day.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

‘Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Siege of Stalingrad

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The Germans did not have this battle all their own way. In the southern part of the city one defense line still held. Its strong point was the grain elevator. The first German attack on 16 September erupted in a savage firefight. On 18 September the fighting entered the elevator itself. Soon the grain caught fire and the fighting took place in thick smoke.

In the north the Soviets counterattacked on 19 September. The battle raged for two days. Each night Soviet Po-2 biplanes bombed the enemy flying 600 sorties.

On 20 September the Germans attacked the grain elevator using tanks. Soviet resistance broke two days later and the grain elevator fell to the Germans in spite of air attacks directed from the ground using rockets, smoke signals and tracers to indicate targets.

The Air Force for Long Range Operations (AFLRO) attacked German airfields. Flights of fighter aircraft, operating as hunters, drove enemy aircraft out of their forward airfields.

By 27 September the battle shifted to the residential and factory districts.

The 16th Air Army had 232 aircraft, 152 of them serviceable. This included 13 night bombers, down from 31 after their previous work.

Most of the southern and central parts of Stalingrad had fallen to the Germans. Only the northern factory district held out. The Germans had suffered 7,700 dead and 31,000 wounded. The Russians lost 80,000 casualties.

On 2 October General von Paulus renewed his attacks on the northern factory district. Aerial and artillery bombardment exploded the oil reserves at the Red October Ordnance Factory. Burning oil poured into General Chuikov’s headquarters dugout. Tanks and infantry attacked the Red October factory, the Barricades Plant, and the Tractor Factory. Fighting extended into the plants, the cellars, and the sewers. The German soldiers, assisted by Stukas, advanced their front toward the Volga by more than 400 meters by 8 October.

On 14 October General von Paulus began his ‘Final Offensive.’ Three infantry divisions and two tank regiments took parts of the Tractor Factory and surrounded the rest. By 23 October half of the Red October fell and most of the Barricades was taken.

From 27 through 29 October the 8th Air Army and the AFLRO raided and damaged thirteen German airfields in 502 sorties. During the month of October 260 mass air battles occurred in the Stalingrad area. The Luftwaffe lost eleven percent of their aircraft in four months of fighting.

From 1 September to 1 November only five Soviet infantry divisions crossed the Volga into Stalingrad. At the same time 27 fresh infantry divisions and 19 armored brigades were activated. These forces were concentrated between Saratov and Povorino, northwest of Stalingrad and received training and combat experience.

By 7 November General von Paulus held 90% of Stalingrad, but it was no longer a town.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Onslaught,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1973

War Over the Steppes: The Air Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941—45, E. R. Hooton, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, U.K.,2016

Stalingrad

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General Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army finally arrived south of Stalingrad, after its turn at Kotelnikovo, and attacked the Soviet 64th Army commanded by Major General M. S. Shumilov. In the hill country, the 64th Army fought the Fourth Panzer Army to a standstill on 23 August.

As the area around Red Square burned, 6,000 soldiers were ferried across the Volga River and sent north to confront Lieutenant General Hans Hube’s 16th Panzer Division which entered Stalingrad from the west striking toward the tractor factory on the north end of the city. These soldiers, with the assistance of unpainted T-34 tanks from the factory driven by factory workers, stopped this attack.

Adolf Hitler moved his headquarters from Rastenburg, East Prussia to Vinnitsa, Ukraine on 25 August. On the same date a state of siege was declared in Stalingrad.

Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko was quietly removed from command of the defense of Stalingrad, and replaced by the savior of Moscow, General Georgy Zhukov, with Varonov in charge of artillery, and Novikov in charge of the Soviet Air Force in the Stalingrad area.

General Hoth’s troops sidestepped the Soviet position in the hills south of Stalingrad and attacked on 30 August penetrating the Soviet fortification at Gavrilovka. This move threatened to drive a wedge between the Soviet 64th and 62nd Armies. The 64th Army retreated into the city.

Turning east Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army struck into the city and reached the Volga River south of the grain elevator on 10 September.

Lieutenant General Aleksandr I. Lopatin, commanding the 62nd Army, was relieved of command on 12 September and replaced by General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov who promised he would hold the city or die there.

On the same date, Lieutenant General Friedrich von Paulus and General Maximillian von Weichs were called to Hitler’s headquarters in Vinnitsa. He told them it was vital to take Stalingrad and the banks of the Volga River. Von Paulus voiced concerns about the northern flank of the Sixth Army, at which point Hitler reassured him the allied armies were watching the Volga banks in that area.

Von Paulus launched his main offensive on 13 September after an artillery bombardment.

On the 14th of September Chuikov moved his headquarters from the threatened Mamayev Hill to the bunker in the Tsaritsa Gorge.

The Luftwaffe bombed Soviet forces, concentrating on the railroad station where the Soviets kept their last reserve of tanks.

Under severe pressure, Chuikov knew he had to keep the Germans from taking the Volga River ferry landing. Without that the 10,000 soldier of the 13th Guards Division, commanded by Major General Alexandr Ilyich Rodintsev, would not be able to reinforce the defenders.

Rodintsev’s soldiers landed on the west bank of the Volga on 15 September and were able to retake Mamayev Hill on the 16th.

The battle for Stalingrad took on the appearance of a house-by-house fight. This erased the German army’s superiority in training and teamwork allowing the Soviets to take advantage of their knowledge of the city to pop up behind the German lines and force them to fight back through areas they had already taken.

By 21 September the Germans cleared all of the Tsaritsa Gorge and positioned themselves within a few yards of the landing stage forcing Chuikov to move his headquarters to the Matveyev-Kurgon area.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Drive to the Don,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“Stalingrad: The Onslaught,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Drive to Stalingrad

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“The Russian is finished,” Hitler told Colonel General Halder on 20 July, 1942. Thus was born a new plan. With Field Marshal von Bock gone Directive 45, issued on 23 July, ordered Army Group A, commanded by General List, south to take the Caucasus and the oil reserves there. Army Group B, commanded by General Weichs, was to take Stalingrad and cut off the isthmus between the Don River and the Volga.

The battle for Rostov, fought by XVII Army, began on 22 July. It ended on 24 July and the first German units crossed the Don.

Kleist’s I Panzer Army was to take the Don River crossings. OKH, however, felt the Soviet forces in the Donets River basin would hold up Kleist’s panzers, so IV Panzer Army, commanded by General Hoth, was diverted to assist Kleist. The Russian forces seemed to evaporate, so Kleist and Hoth arrived at the Don River crossings at about the same time. Kleist got his panzers across the river between 25 and 27 July due to congestion. General Hoth got his panzers across on 29 July at Tsimlyanskaya. General Hoth was then directed through Kotelnikovo, to strike north taking Stalingrad in the rear.

Von Paulus. on his way to the Don at Kalach, ran out of fuel 240 kilometers from his goal. Soviet General Timoshenko took advantage of the delay by filling the Don bend with Soviet troops.

While von Paulus waited for fuel for his tanks General Kleist took Prolettarskaya on 29 July and Salsk on the Manych River on 31 July. Weichs moved south toward Krasnodar while XI Army in Crimea crossed the strait from Kerch to the Kuban Peninsula to assist him.

Hoth’s Panzers reached Kotelnikovo on 31 July, threatening the flank of the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies in Stalingrad. The Soviet Air Force was not idle. On 1 August LaGG 3 fighters armed with 37 mm cannon attack the tanks. Two hundred sixty-four sorties were flown on 5 August against the Germans at the Abganerovo and Plodovitoye railroad stations as the Germans moved on Tinguta. Another Soviet attack hit the airfield at Bolshaya Donshchina.

On 9 August Kleist took Maikop.

Meanwhile, von Paulus finally made his move. Using his 14th Panzer Korps and the 24th Panzer Korps on loan from Hoth he used a double envelopment to surround the troops at Kalach on 8 August. The haul included 35,000 soldiers, 270 tanks and armored vehicles, and 600 guns. Von Paulus forces faced Stalingrad on 10 August.

In the rush to take Kalach, and as a result of his lack of forces, von Paulus did not occupy the small bend in the Volga River at Kletskaya. He left to the Rumanians the guarding of Russian forces in that space. He would later regret that choice.

Hoth’s IV Panzer army arrived on von Paulus southern flank on 19 August. On 21 August the VI Army crossed the Don.

The Soviet Air Force, realizing the situation developing in the south, sent five divisions of the AFLRO (Air Force Long Range Operations) from Moscow to Stalingrad. The 8th Air Army received fighter units equipped with the new La 5.

XVI Panzer Korps penetrated the Soviet perimeter at Stalingrad on 22 August and reached the Volga through the northern suburbs. The railroad bridge over the Volga at Rynok came within mortar range.

On the night of 23/24 August the Luftwaffe delivered a night attack in three waves against the Soviet 64th Army. Half of the bombs dropped were incendiaries.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Drive to the Don,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1973

Army Group South, Summer 1942

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With Kursk, Kharkov, and Sevastopol taken, Hitler’s eyes turned to the oil fields of the Caucasus. The General Staff ordered Field Marshall von Bock to send General Herman Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army from Kursk to Voronezh on the Don River. Second Army followed them.

Lieutenant General Friedrich von Paulus’ Sixth Army, with eleven divisions, and General Stumme’s 40th Panzer Corps attacked from Kharkov northeast to Voronezh to trap the Soviet armies between the Oskol and the Don Rivers.

These actions began on 28 July, 1942.

STAVKA noted the high concentration of armor in the south, but with the renewal of the attack on Leningrad, they estimated the German southern action could be directed through Yelets and Tula toward Moscow. Any reserves in the south, moved toward Moscow, could be trapped. They ordered Marshal Timoshenko to maintain two ‘hinges.’ One at Voronezh and the other at Rostov to threaten the German’s southern flank.

By 30 June, the German thrust from Kursk reached the halfway point to Voronezh, meeting no resistance.

STAVKA ordered 40th Army to fight at Voronezh while Timoshenko fell back on Stalingrad.

Hitler flew to von Bock’s headquarters on 3 July. He advised von Bock to bypass Voronezh and go south instead. On 4 July that order was reversed. Von Bock was to take Voronezh despite the occupation of the city by the 40th Army.

Hoth’s panzers reached Voronezh, straddling the city on 5 July. STAVKA, meanwhile, established the Voronezh Front on the same day, naming General Vatutin as commander, reporting directly to Moscow, rather than to Timoshenko.

By 12 July the Soviets woke to the threat of the German advance. The Stalingrad Front was established naming the 63rd, 21st, 62nd, and 64th Armies as its compliment. General Chuikov, commander of the 64th Army, located at Tula, advised the Soviet command he could not reach his required position before 23 July. Air support for the Stalingrad Front was the 8th Air Army commanded by T. T. Khryukin.

Von Bock’s forces cleared Voronezh on 13 July and Hitler ordered his advance on Stalingrad, sealing off the city with one arm, while the other would capture Rostov near the Sea of Azov.

Soviet air operations supporting the 62nd and 64th Armies on the Chir and Tsimlya Rivers began on 17 July. The long range bombing operation concentrated on German crossings over the Chir and Don Rivers. The 8th Air Army possessed 300 aircraft consisting of 150 to 200 long range aircraft, and 50 to 60 fighters of the 102nd Fighter Air Division and the Air Defense Force. This opposed the Luftwaffe‘s 1,200 aircraft.

Von Kleist’s First Panzer Army, originally directed as the southern prong against Stalingrad, was now ordered straight to Rostov. Herman Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army, originally to stiffen von Paulus’ Sixth Army was now ordered to assist von Kleist.

When Field Marshal von Bock protested, wanting to use Weich’s unit and part of von Paulus’ to deal with Vatutin at Voronezh, he was sacked. Weich’s forces were to guard the Don River from Voronezh to the Don bend.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Drive to the Don,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1973

The Defense of Sevastopol

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The defenses of Sevastopol consisted of three lines. The first line, one and a half to three kilometers deep, was made up of trenches, tank obstacles, and mine fields. The second line was a kilometer and a half deep north of the city. Maxim Gorki I, north of the city near the Belbek River, was 300 meters long, 40 meters deep and held 300 millimeter guns.

South of the city a second line, the Zapun line, on the Zapun heights included thirteen fortresses or strong points. Maxim Gorki II, located six and a half kilometers south of the city was similar to Maxim Gorki I.

It took the Germans two days to break through the first line of defenses. They then concentrated on reducing Fortress Stalin several kilometers behind the line of defenses. They captured that fortress on 13 June.

The battle for Maxim Gorki I continued. This fortress controlled the Belbek River down to the Black Sea more than five and a half kilometers away. Barrages of one ton shells opened the gun emplacements. Once the Germans infiltrated the fortress the battles continued underground until 17 June when the fortress was taken. Four other fortresses fell the same day.

During the fighting both sides took heavy losses. XLVI Infantry Division reinforced the German attackers. In the second half of June units from XVII Army, operating in the Donbass region, were sent. The Soviets received no replacements and suffered shortages of ammunition. By the end of June artillery fired only at short range targets. There was much hand-to-hand combat.

The Germans reached Severnaya Bay north of Sevastopol city on 18 June. This bay, 970 meters wide, separated the Germans from the city. On 20 June they infiltrated North Fortress, located in the German rear, from the sea. That gone, the Soviets retreated to the south shore of Severnaya Bay on 23 June.

South of the Sevastopol City the Germans elected to outflank the Zapun defense lines on the Zapun Heights by attacking the Inkerman highway beside the Chernaya River. Inside the mountain was a Soviet armaments factory. On 28 June the Germans crossed the Chernaya River to attack the arms factory. The Soviets elected to blow up the factory and themselves.

On the night of 28/29 June the Germans launched an attack across Severnaya Bay in assault boats.  In the south they launched an attack from the Fedyukhim Heights southeast of Sevastopol toward Zapun Mountain. The Soviet defenses were broken and the Soviet began evacuation to Cape Khersones on the western end of the Crimea by water. Some escaped into the mountains. Military leaders and some of the wounded were evacuated by submarine. Aircraft of the Sevastopol Defense Force were moved to airfields in the Caucasus.

The inner city was bombarded by the Germans on 1 July. The remaining Soviets surrendered on 3 July. The Germans took more than 100,000 prisoners.

Sources: ‘The Siege of Savastopol,’ Colonel Vasili Morozov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

All-Out Offensive on All Fronts

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At a meeting of STAVKA on 5 January, 1942, Stalin called for an “all-out offensive” against the Germans. The proposal consisted of attacks by all nine fronts against all three German army groups.

In the north the objective was the freeing of Leningrad from encirclement. In the center Stalin wanted liberty for the Donbas region. In the south an assault to retake the Crimea.

General Zhukov, honored as the savior of Moscow, and Voznesensky objected based on the weakened condition of the Soviet Army. With the support of Timoshenko, Beria, and Malenkov, Stalin overrode the objections.

The attacks started on 7 January. Northwest Front struck north from south of Lake Ilmen but failed to take Staraya Russa. On 13 January the Volkov Front on the Volkov River found itself unable to move against the Germans. Lack of ammunition, food, and fuel prevented the troops from passing into and through Lyuban.

On 9 January 3rd and 4th Shock Armies cut south behind Army Group Center. Short of food, the troops knew the only way to succeed was to take the German supply dump at Toropets.

Kalinin Front worked to surround the German IX Army near Sychevka while cavalry attacked to surround German forces in Rzhev. General Zhukov’s forces moved through the ‘Kaluga Gap’ and attacked north toward Vyazma to surround Sukinichi.

The Luftwaffe flew in supplies for seven German divisions surrounded in Demyansk.

Fifteen hundred Soviet paratroops were dropped on Zhelanye and operated behind German lines with the assistance of partisans.

The less than spectacular results of these operations prompted Stalin to take command. He transferred the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies to the Kalinin Front. First Shock Army was detached from Kalinin Front and assigned to Northwest Front. He then directed 16th Army detached from Zhukov’s forces and sent to Bryansk Front to take Sukhinichi.

Govin’s spearheads were on the road to Minsk when Army Group Center, itself nearly surrounded, cut off those forces near Vyazma.

Casualties during this offensive were high. By late January Kalinin Front had 35 tanks remaining. High Command Reserve Artillery had only six guns. Rifle divisions had 3,000 to 3,700 soldiers each. 13th Army, originally assigned 11,500 soldiers, had been reduced to the size of a division. Tank brigades possessed 15 to 20 tanks, and artillery regiments had 12 guns.

Air support for ground forces vanished as the front moved out of the range of fighters.

General Model surrounded the Soviet 39th and 29th Armies at Rzhev.

In Army Group South’s area General Timoshenko crossed the Donets River and drove a wedge 97 kilometers deep into the German positions near Izyum.

In the Crimea Soviet troops crossed from the Kerch Peninsula and moved as far west as Feodosiya before the Germans forced them to a stop.

Sources: “The Russian Recovery,” John Erickson, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“The Moscow Counterblow,” Marshal Zhukov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Co, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973

The Battle for Moscow – Part 1

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With the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941, a state of threat existed in Moscow. The Soviet Army began building 12 divisions for the defense of the city. Twenty-five battalions of militia patrolled the outskirts of the city against the chance of parachute troop assaults. Firefighting units were established. Citizens camouflaged the Bolshoi Theater to look like small houses. Larger buildings were made to appear like parks from the air.

German night air raids on the city began on the night of 21-22 July. Thirty-six took place during the period from July through September.

The citizens of Moscow built the Vyazma Defense Line and, on 16 July work on the Mozhaysk Defense Line began. One hundred thousand citizens of the city, 2/3rds women and children, built three lines of defenses around the city. These were known as the Ring Road, the Sadovoye Ring, and the Boulevard Ring. Six hundred eighty kilometers of anti-tank ditches, 447 kilometers of breastworks, 383 kilometers of anti-tank barriers, 30,000 firing points, 1,306 kilometers of barbed wire, and 1,537 kilometers of wooden obstructions in wooded areas were built.

Obstacles including metal spikes, barbed wire entanglements, and minefields were placed in the streets.

In the factories of Moscow workers repaired 263 guns, 1,700 mortars, 15,000 rifles and 2,000 lorries.

Partisan groups were organized and armed with rifles, grenades, warm uniforms, and food. Forty detachments formed in Moscow with another 30 in Tula.

On 8 October heavy rain slowed the movement of the German forces. IV Army reached the area east of Kaluga, their left on the Borovsk – Mozhaysk Line. IX Army reached the Volga at Kalinin and Rzhev. General Guderian’s forces established positions on either side of the Bryansk Pocket but the weather and fuel and supply shortages hindered his operations.

Marshal Zhukov, hero of the battle at Kalkin Gol in Mongolia, took command of the Western Front. General Konev commanded the Kalinin Front.

Fighting around Vyazma ended on 14 October. The Germans liquidated the Bryansk Pocket on 20 October. Field Marshal von Bock, in his report of 19 October, claimed the destruction of eight Soviet armies, but he worried about his southern flank where a gap between Army Group South opened near Belgorod due to the slow advance of II Army.

OKH issued new orders on 14 October. II Panzer Army was to move on Moscow from the south and east while IV Army and IV Panzer Gruppe were to close in from the north and west. II Army was released from Bryansk. II Panzer Army received orders to move on the Orel – Kursk – Yelets line to protect Army Group Center’s southern flank.

The season of mud began in the second half of October. The only paved road in Byelorussia connected Smolensk and Moscow. This road, torn up by traffic and Soviet bombing forced the Germans to form road crews to fill the craters. Traffic bogged down. Horses died from overwork and starvation. Communications were cut and air support was unavailable.

Sources: “Battle for Moscow: The Soviet View,” Colonel D. Proektor, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“Battle for Moscow: The German View,” Generalmajor (AD) Alfred Phillippi, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Writers’ Block

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Spoiler Alert: This article does not pretend to include a therapy for dealing with writers’ block.

Writers’ block is a condition most writers deal with at some time in their career. I’m no exception.

Like many, if not most writers, I started writing for my own personal entertainment. I submitted a short story to a magazine at the tender age of 12.

During elementary and high schools, and into college, I wrote constantly. I entered writing contests and won second place awards. Those stories featured combat flying – an adventure that fascinated me.

After college I worked briefly while applying to graduate school. My college grades and lack of a sponsor prohibited that route. My draft number was seven so I elected to join the Navy to avoid the draft.

While in the Navy, and after I completed my obligation, I continued to write. My production filled an eight foot shelf of bound copies in typescript. (Yes, I used a typewriter.)

I wrote six science fiction stories and submitted them to three science fiction magazines. None were accepted. Since I was getting married in a month the decision was made to get a paying job. I continued to write after getting married.

When my parents sold their house and moved into an apartment, I went through my hoard of typescript choosing and saving stories for which I won awards, and stories I felt had merit. The rest I burned in the burning barrel in my parent’s backyard.

I took writers’ classes at the local university and went to writing retreats to hone my skills, but queries to publishers went unanswered. This is a story familiar to many writers today. The market seemed to me to have shrunk.

Back to the subject, I experienced writers’ block, but I’m obsessed with writing, so I never experienced an extended block. During those years I wrote two military historical novels and finally found an Indie Publisher who published those novels. I have no problems with ‘vanity presses’. None of my work would have seen the light of day if not for that option.

Now I’m my own marketer. I can’t say I sell a lot of books, but selling a book is always a thrill.  I’ll never make up the amount I paid for professional editors, but I felt adding some professionalism to my work was worth the price. Some people make a living with their writing, and I admire them. I continue writing and I may have a third novel published soon – fingers crossed.

Why I Write About the Soviet Union in WW II

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My fascination with combat aircraft in World War II began when I was a child. My father served in the United States Navy during that war. His final assignment included repairing damaged Naval aircraft on Guam in 1944. My interest led to a study of those aircraft, and then to the use of them in war.

I wrote about those aircraft in war. I wrote about the Lancaster bomber of the RAF. I wrote about the B-25 skip bombing during the battle for New Guinea, air combat over Spain in the Spanish Civil War, Ju-88s over Great Britain during the Battle of Britain, and about the defending Hurricanes. I even wrote a story about RAF pilots flying the P-40 over the North African desert.

When I built a model of the La-5 I felt compelled to write about the valiant Soviet pilots flying against the German invaders. That story featured the battle for the Kursk Salient, a pivotal moment signaling the demise of the Wehrmacht. This battle was the greatest tank and aircraft battle in history before the US invasion of Iraq.

My research drew a desire to understand, to the best of my ability, the stresses of battling, hope against hope, to save their country and their people.

I am not Russian, nor am I German, but a descendant of both peoples. This front forced me to turn away from any disposition to favor one people over the other in that cataclysmic struggle engulfing both countries. Only my readers can say if I succeeded.

Neither country deserved advancement over the other or suggested excuses for the atrocities committed by either side. I sought to hold a glass on World War II showing how both sides, in defense of aggression, explained their behavior. This was total war.

Far from being works of art free from error, I am aware, after nearly fifty years of research on the campaign and the cultures of both countries, of errors made in details

Having never fired a weapon in anger with intent to kill, my efforts probably seem sophomoric in the extreme. Happily, in all my years of military service I was never forced into a position where I needed to kill another human being.

As I wrote about the Battle forthe Kursk Salient I learned about the women who served in the Soviet Air Force in World War II. Marina Roskova, a famous Soviet woman aviator, convinced Stalin to allow women to fight. She commanded an air division consisting of regiments of fighters, day bombers, and night bombers (the storied Night Witches). I felt compelled to write about a woman fighter pilot, based very loosely on Lilia Litvak.

Both novels, Cauldron and Crucible, are currently available on Amazon and Kindle and soon to be available on demand in libraries and bookstores.

I thank Philip Marten and Lisa Lickel, my editors, and S.W. Strackbein of Sisyphus Triumphant Publishing for all of their work in making these novels available.

Spring 1943 Plans

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The Soviet Command in mid-February 1943 was filled with optimism. Marshal Golikov believed the Germans were in full retreat. General Vatutin felt the same and discounted General Popov’s and Lieutenant General Kuznetsov’s objections due to the exhaustion of the troops, supply difficulties, worn out equipment, and low unit strength. Vatutin felt the Germans were on the run and believed Southwest Front could destroy the German forces in the Donbass.

Stavka ordered Voronezh, Southwest, and South Fronts pursue German forces out of the Ukraine east of the Dniepr River. This order neglected the fact that the nearest source of supplies for these fronts was Kharkov, 105 kilometers to the rear.

Marshal Zhukov objected to the main assault on the southern part of the front, feeling the best option was to use forces to the north which had not been involved with the fighting in Stalingrad. Stalin overrode Zhukov. He wanted to take Kharkov, intending to use it as a springboard for the taking of Kiev.

As the Germans retreated, von Manstein used the time consolidating his armor in the Poltava area, preparing for a counter offensive. Hitler inclined toward a ‘Stand Fast’ order with an objective of retaking Kharkov. Von Manstein recommended waiting until the Soviet Army took the crossings on the Upper Dniepr, then striking with his Panzers north and south of the Soviet spearhead before the spring thaw. This maneuver would cause Kharkov to fall and give the Germans six weeks respite during the thaw to consolidate their forces and restore cohesion.

In the first phase of von Manstein’s plan the SS Panzer Corps would assemble at Krasnograd, while the 48 and 57 Panzer Corps would gather at Krasnoarmeyskoye. These forces would converge on the right wing of the Soviet Southwest Front.

In phase two these forces would regroup southwest of Kharkov and strike the Voronezh front, driving them back over the northern Donets to recapture Kharkov and Belgorod.

In the third phase II Panzer Army from Army Group Center would strike south from Orel to meet von Manstein’s strike from the south to take Kursk.

The offensive start date was February 19 – 20. The day before the offensive von Manstein would take command of forces as Krasnogrod and Krasnoarmeyskoye. The forces consisted of VII Panzer Division, SS Viking Motorized Infantry Division, and four army infantry divisions.

On 18 February Vatutin launched his attack in accordance with the Stavka directive. This included 6th Army reinforced by one corps of tanks and one of cavalry to cut off the German retreat to the Dniepr River. The rest of his forces, along with the South Front would attack to keep the Germans pinned in the Donbass.

Regrettably, ‘Front Mobile Force’ was worn down my months of combat. Their strength included 13,000 men, and 53 tanks. The Germans had a superiority of 2 to 1 in manpower, 7 to 1 in tanks, and 3 to 1 in aircraft.

Air reconnaissance on 19 February revealed a heavy concentration of German armor around Krasnograd and southwest of Krasnoarmeyskoe and large numbers of German troops at Dnepropetrovsk.

Source: ‘Soviet Setback After Stalingrad’, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Von Manstein’s Relief Attempt

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With Stalingrad surrounded, the Soviet Army’s next move tightened the noose. Southwest Front’s 21st Army headed east and crossed the Don on 27 November. Don Front’s 65th Army headed east toward Vertyachiy and Peskovatka. Stalingrad Front’s 4th Tank Army struck northeast to Kalach to meet up with 26th Tank Corps encircling German forces across the Don.

Remnants of III Rumanian Army fell back to the Chir River forming a defensive line between the mouth of the Chir and Vershenskaya railway station in conjunction with the IV Rumanian Army and German troops. XVII Army Corps positioned themselves between the Chir and Krivaya Rivers near Dubovskoe.

XLVIII Panzer Corps occupied the gap between the III Rumanian Army and XVII Army Corps. Army Group Don set up a defensive position between Army Groups A and B. This included Operational Group Hollidt and IV Panzer Army.

Von Manstein intended to relieve von Paulus’ forces. The plan was called Operation Winter Storm. German forces on the Chir River near Nizhne-Chirskaya were only 65 kilometers from von Paulus’ forces. Colonel General Hoth, in Kotelnikovo, was only 120 kilometers away, but in a better position for penetration through the Soviet forces to link up with the surrounded VI Army. Von Manstein intended XLVIII Panzer Corps of Operational Group Hollidt as the spearhead.

By 29 November the area occupied by VI Army had been reduced by half.

On the Soviet side, a new offensive called Saturn was in the planning stage. Southwest Front, reinforced with 1st Guards Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, and the left wing of the Voronezh Front, would attack the Italian VIII Army on the middle Don between Novaya Kalitva and Vershinskaya, and enemy forces on the Chir River and around Tormosin. The attack would then proceed south toward Millerovo and Rostov.

Meanwhile, 5th Tank Army worked to wear down German forces on the Chir River line.

Major General Hermann Balck, commander of IX Panzer Division raced north from Rostov to attack Soviet forces surrounding Stalingrad. On 7 December he encountered two Soviet tank brigades at State Farm 79. After nightfall, Balck left a blocking force, circled around the Soviet armored force and attacked them from the north destroying 53 tanks. He then received notification of a Soviet bridgehead across the Chir River. He eliminated that bridgehead, but the Soviets now had many of them across the Chir.

On 8 December STAVKA ordered 5th Shock Army, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, to attack between 51st Army, Stalingrad Front, and 5th Tank Army, Southwest Front, in preparation for an attack on von Paulus’ forces.

Operation Winter Storm began on 12 December when Colonel General Hoth’s forces attacked out of Kotelnikovo. His 13 divisions were opposed by the Soviet 5th Shock and the 51st Army’s eight rifle divisions, permanent fortifications, two mechanized and two cavalry corps, four tank brigades, eight artillery and mortar regiments, and two regiments of rocket artillery.

There was hope that the Hoth Group could make contact with von Paulus’ VI Army by driving northeast toward Stalingrad along the railway. VI and XXIII Panzer Divisions with cavalry and infantry made a breakthrough trying to link up with VI Army southwest of Tundutovo Station. They were opposed by the 126th and 302nd Rifle Divisions of the 51st Army.

Exploiting the German’s superiority in tanks and aircraft, VI Panzer Division reached the southern bank of the Aksey River. XXIII Panzer Division penetrated north of Nebekovo.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s